analyses of changes in homicide rates associated with the aboliton or installment of capital punishment, 3 (3) comparisons of homicide rates between states with relatively high rates of execution and those with relatively low rates of execution, 4 or (4) comparisons of homicide rates for different social groups (e.g., blacks, women, white men) and their correlation with the rates of executions within those groups. 5 The appearance of Isaac Ehrlich's first study in 1975 revived the plausibility of deterrence. 6 Using an econometrics model to predict the "supply" of homicides, Ehrlich reported a significant elasticity in the homicide rate associated with the probability of murderers being exe-cuted following their convictions. He concluded that "an additional execution per year over the period in question ) may have resulted, on average, in seven to eight fewer murders." '7 A second study by Ehrlich based on cross-sectional state data for the two years of 1940 and 1950 led him to a similar conclusion. 8 At about the same time, a study by Yunker examining the correlation between the number of executions per year and the homicide rate three years later led to the even stronger conclusion that each execution deters 156 murders. 9 These studies have been reviewed often and thoroughly. Various authors have shown that the findings may be an artifact of the statistical procedures used or the specific characteristics of the time intervals selected for study. In addition, the studies have been criticized for their failure to include particular control variables which could account for the observed deterrence, and their treatment of data in aggregate rather than by state or region.' 0 Since these criticisms are well reported, there is no need to detail them again. It is sufficient to say that the studies by Ehrlich and Yunker do not conclusively verify the deterrent effect of the death penalty.
Several recent studies using econometric models have tried to correct the flaws of the Ehrlich studies." None of these studies found significant elasticity coefficients for capital punishment as a predictor of homicide rates, even though they employed a number of different measures of execution and homicide rates. Taken together, the econometric studies do not provide unequivocal evidence of deterrence.
Two other lines of research, however, have recently yielded results consistent with the deterrence hypothesis. Lester has shown that the likelihood of a decrease in homicides in a given state from one year to the next is statistically related to whether that state executed prisoners during the first year.1 2 This likelihood is also related to the number of ex-ecutions in the state the first year, with nine to sixteen executions producing a significantly greater likelihood of a drop in the number of homicides (69% likelihood) than eight or fewer executions (52% likelihood). With more than sixteen executions in a state in a given year, however, the likelihood of a drop in homicides the following year is only 61%, which is not significantly different from either of the other two percentages. 13 One can envision third-variable causes which might undermine a deterrence interpretation of Lester's data. For example, the declining execution rate for the nation as a whole in the 1950's and 1960's was coupled with rising murder rates. The growing murder rates, however, can be attributed to the rising percentage of fifteen to twenty-four yearolds in the general population, 14 A second approach has yielded evidence of a different kind of pattern of deterrence. Phillips, starting with the assumption that deterrence should be strongest in the weeks immediately following an execution, analyzed the weekly homicide statistics for London, England before and after twenty-two highly publicized executions from the years 1858 through 1921. He found that the homicide rate declined by about 35% for each of the two weeks following these executions. He also found that the more extensive the newspaper accounts of an execution, the greater the drop in homicides. In the third through the fifth weeks following the executions, however, the homicide rates rebounded above the original baselines, virtually cancelling the deterrent effects of the two previous weeks. Following the fifth week, the homicide rates returned to their baselines.18 Only one small effort has examined the short-term deterrent effect of American executions for the nation as a whole. Using a chi-square analysis, Lester found that the number of homicides for the two weeks following Gary Gilmore's execution in 1977 dropped more than for a comparable two-week period from the preceding year, but the difference was only marginally significant. 23 This same decline is analyzed with different methods and discussed in detail in the present paper. 24 Apart from Lester's brief study, no major effort has been made to verify or disprove the existence of a short-term deterrent effect for capital punishment in the United States. As Phillips notes, 2 5 American data are more likely than British findings to significantly affect American opinion and policy on capital punishment. For a variety of reasons, a pattern of deterrence found in England might not generalize to the United States. English retribution for murder during the period of Phillips' study was much swifter than it currently is in the United States. Executions were more certain to follow conviction and sentencing; appeals and prolonged delays were much rarer. In addition, the English newspapers often described the trials and executions in gruesome detail. Furthermore, England is a much more compact country than the 19 Graves reports trends which suggested both a two-day decrease in homicides immediately following each California execution and a two-day increase in homicides (a "brutalizing effect") just before each execution. Graves, A Doctor Looks at Capital Punishment, 10 J. LoMA LINDA SCH. MED. 137 (1956) , reprinted in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: AN ANTHOL-OGY (H. Bedau ed. 1964). These trends represent comparisons of the days of 74 weeks in which there were executions with the days of 116 control weeks in which there were no executions. Unfortunately, however, Graves did not report any tests for the significance of these trends. Chi-square analyses by the present author found that neither the deterrent effect, x 2 (l) = 2.08, p < .10, nor the brutalizing effect, x 2 (l) = 2.49, p < .10, were significant. . The present study covers the first four of these executions; the last three occurred while this paper was in preparation, so the homicide rates surrounding them were not available.
29
Each of the executions covered in the present study received extensive news coverage, although the amount of coverage decreased substantially with each successive execution. Gilmore's execution was a major media event, since his was the first in more than a decade. In the ten weeks preceding the execution, the three major television networks averaged over twenty-seven minutes of total air-time on Gilmore. 30 On the day of the execution, it was the lead news story on all three networks, receiving an average of seven minutes and ten seconds per network.
1
Newsweek devoted twenty column inches to the execution; 32 Time spent thirty-eight inches covering it. 
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The coverage of the subsequent executions decreased substantially. The networks averaged four minutes and forty seconds of coverage on the day of Spenkelink's execution, two minutes on Bishop's, and one minute on Judy's. 34 The declines in network and news magazine coverage preceding the executions parallel these figures. 35 Still, each execution was a major news event, a condition which Phillips' findings suggest is necessary for a substantial deterrent effect to occur.
Since weekly homicide rates are available from 1972 to the present, it is possible to use Box-Jenkins ARIMA modeling for the data analyses.
3 6 The advantages of this procedure over the nonparametric procedures used by Phillips are that one can examine time-series data for nonstationarity, 3 7 autoregressive processes, 38 and moving-average processes.
39 Seasonal or annual changes in the data due to nonstationarity, autoregression, and moving-average processes can also be identified. In a sequential process, ARIMA modeling allows one to identify which of these sources of systematic variance are contained in the timeseries data set, to calculate a parameter which estimates the strength of each source of variance, and to use these parameters in predicting particular data-points within the series. Confidence boundaries can be calculated for each prediction. One can then examine whether the observed data-points deviate significantly from their predictions.
40
ARIMA modeling of the homicide data in the present arrays revealed significant autoregressive, moving-average, and seasonal autoregressive parameters, an ARIMA (1,0,1) (1,0,0) model. Tests of the adequacy of this model showed that the arrays contained no other systematic sources of variance.
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, TELEVISION NEWS INDEX AND ABSTRACTS (1979, 1981).
35 For example, Newsweek gave only nine column inches to the execution of Mr. Spenkelink, Electric Chair is Turned On, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1979, at 26, and did not report the last two executions at all. While the failure to obtain complete homicide rates surrounding the last three executions is regrettable, these data are sufficient to discern the deterrent and rebound effects of the executions, if any.
37 Non-stationarity is a linear increase or decrease in the rates from the beginning to the end of the time period.
38 An auto-regressive process is a pattern of systematic increase and decreases in the observed frequencies over a range of sequential observations. 39 A moving-average process is a "random shock" effect, a tendency for one observation to impact upon the immediately following observation. Figure 1 presents the predicted national homicide rates from the ARIMA model, the lower 95% confidence boundary of the predicted rates, 4 1 and the actual number of homicides for each of the five weeks preceding and each of the eight weeks following the execution of Gary Gilmore. Figures 2 through 4 present the same information for the weeks surrounding each of the other three executions. In each of the two weeks following Gilmore's execution, the number of homicides was significantly lower than predicted by the ARIMA model, p < .05 for each week. None of the other eleven weeks presented in Figure 1 showed a similar lower-than-predicted homicide rate. The third through the fifth weeks following the execution, however, give no evidence of a systematic increase in homicides as was reported by Phillips for the London data. 4 2 Moreover, Figures 2 through 4 indicate that the other three executions had no discernible effect on homicide rates. 4 3 On the surface, the interpretation most consistent with Phillips' results is that the Gilmore execution had a deterrent effect on homicides because of its massive publicity, while the lower publicity given to the remaining executions prevented them from having such an effect. However, a closer examination of the Gilmore execution suggests an alternate explanation. Gilmore's execution occurred on January 17, 1977, and coincided almost exactly with the onset of one of the worst blizzards ever to hit the eastern United States. Snow fell as far south as Georgia and Alabama and temperatures for this two-week period plunged far below normal. Weather conditions in the industrial states were the worst in years.44 The parameter for controlling seasonality in the ARIMA model may not be sufficient to account for the impact of this unusually bad weather on homicide rates. Without further analysis, one 41 A frequency which falls on or below this boundary can be attributed to a causal event with 95% certainty and would occur by chance only 5 times in 100 occurrences. 42 The unusually high homicide rates during the last two weeks of December is not an aberration. The homicide frequencies for each year covered by this study showed similar spikes. During the 1970's, the last four weeks of December averaged, in order, 370, 408, 441, and 428 homicides. In the first week of January, the average number of homicides returned to 370. Murder, then, increases during the holidays. 43 The frequencies are such that the addition of the uncollected 5% of the national homicide data for 1979 and 16% of the data for 1981 would be very unlikely to produce either the two-week declines or the three-week increases necessary to replicate Phillips' London findings. could argue that the significant decline in homicides following the Gilmore execution was weather related and not due to the execution.
45
These two possible effects on the homicide rates can be disentangled through the use of regional analyses. Thirteen western states had normal temperatures and no unusual precipitation during this two-week period. 46 On the other hand, the seventeen midwestern states were atthe opposite extreme.
4 7 The midwestern states all averaged more than twelve degrees below their normal temperatures and at least some snow fell virtually every day. If the lower homicide rates are exclusively weather related, the western states should not show a significant decline in homicides during the critical two weeks while the midwestern states should show the strongest decline. Figure 5 shows the predicted homicide rates, their lower 95% confidence boundaries, and the actual number of homicides for each of the weeks surrounding the Gilmore execution for the normal-weather western states. Figure 6 presents the same information for the frozen midwestern states. As Figure 5 shows, the homicide rates for the western states did not differ significantly from the predicted rates for either of the two weeks following the Gilmore execution. Figure 6 , however, shows a sharp decline in murders in the midwestern states for the week following the execution, the same week the blizzard hit.
A remaining puzzle is that the national pattern ( Figure 1) shows a sharp decline in homicides during the week of January twenty-fourth, the second week following the Gilmore execution, but this pattern is not found for either the western states ( northeast and the southeast occurred during the week of January twenty-fourth. In the northeast, substantial snow fell on only two days during the week of January seventeenth, while it fell on five days during the week of January twenty-fourth. In the southeast, substantial precipitation (a mixture of rain and snow) fell on one day during the week of January seventeenth, and on five days during the week of January twenty-fourth. 50 As the severe weather moved further south and east, the drop in homicides seems to have followed. The most plausible conclusion of this analysis is that the drop in homicides following the Gilmore execution was caused by the unusually severe winter weather rather than by the execution.
Finally, the possibility of local deterrence should be examined. Short-term deterrence and rebound may occur only in the state of the execution and, perhaps, its contiguous states. This local effect may be lost in the wash of national data. The local data, however, do not support this hypothesis. For example, Figure 9 plots the number of homicides in Florida and its bordering states for the weeks surrounding the Spenkelink execution. No evidence of a decline or rebound is shown. The comparable plots for the other three executions also show no declines or rebounds.
The failure to find local effects is hardly surprising since each of these executions received national news coverage. When executions were more common, as was the case during the period covered by Lester's studies, most executions, no doubt, were reported only in local or statewide media. This limited reporting would of course prohibit a nationwide pattern of deterrence for a given execution. As long as executions in the United States remain rare and each one is reported by the major television networks and news magazines, a national pattern of deterrence is more likely than a local one. 
